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Abstract 
 
Studies of criminal deterrence usually show an effect of certainty of punishment but often fail to 
find an effect of severity.  This is a serious threat to the theoretical underpinnings of deterrence 
theory.  Through both a survey of 39 analyses in 33 published studies and our own reanalysis of an 
often-used data set, we show the problem rests not with the theory but with the analysis of the 
theory.  Finding no severity effect can be traced to “unbundling the theoretical package” when 
moving from the theory to the statistical models used to represent the theory.    
 
 
Introduction 
The economic approach to crime is anchored on the theory of deterrence.  With roots in late 
eighteenth century Classicism, deterrence theory holds that increasing the certainty of punishment, 
in the form of a higher probability of arrest and conviction, or increasing the severity of 
punishment, in the form of longer sentences, will raise the prospective costs of committing a crime.  
With a higher expected cost, crime is deterred.  To register a dissuasive effect in the potential 
criminal’s mind, conviction must follow arrest and punishment must follow conviction.  If 
criminals go unpunished, arresting and convicting become empty threats and could hardly weigh 
much against the gain to be won for committing the crime.   
Despite this reasoning, it has become commonplace in the literature on criminal deterrence 
to downplay the effect of the severity of punishment.  Empirical testing proves generally consistent 
with the theory in regard to the effects that higher probabilities of arrest and conviction have on the 
crime rate.  As for the other half of deterrence theory, severity is often found to be of little 
consequence.  After considering the results from a series of deterrence studies from the 1970s, 
Anne Witte (1983, 320) remarked that “Changes in the probabilities of conviction and 
imprisonment have a greater effect on crime rates than do changes in expected sentence length … 
,” a comment that Scott Decker and Carol Kohfeld (1990, 3) later endorsed, “A large group of 
studies have shown that measures of certainty are inversely related to the level of offenses. The 
same relationship for severity has not been found.” 
More recently, under a study commissioned by the UK Home Office, Andrew von Hirsch 
and his colleagues (von Hirsch et al., 1999) surveyed and analysed the criminal deterrence 
literature.  Their main purpose was to address the reported efficacy of marginal deterrent strategies, 
especially severity effects. They began with reference to research in the 1970s and offered 
observations similar to Witte´s, “…most earlier studies have suggested that certainty has 
substantially the stronger general deterrent effect,” compared to severity (p. 5). Then, after 
reviewing research completed over the past 20 years, von Hirsch et al. remarked that “evidence 
 
concerning severity effects is less impressive” (p.47). They saw “scant evidence” and only “modest 
negative correlations between some severity variables and crime rates, albeit ones that seldom 
achieve statistical significance.” (p. 47) They concluded by asking: “What might account for 
severity’s uncertain and seemingly limited effects” (p. 47-8)?  Our purpose is to supply an answer 
to this question.  
Our answer is that the dubious findings regarding the inconsistent effect of the severity 
component of deterrence theory are a consequence of theoretical slippage when moving from the 
verbal theoretical statement to the statistical representation of that statement.  Our purpose is to 
demonstrate that the failure to include any of the deterrence theory components “unbundles the 
theoretical package”.  For this reason, we argue that the empirical ambiguity with respect to 
sentence severity arises because sometimes the empirical formulation of deterrence theory fails to 
keep the theoretical package intact.  In particular, statistical models that isolate the components 
through the use of separate, additive elements do not account for the expected cost calculation as 
specified in the theory.  Sentence length does not work independently of the probability of arrest 
and conviction.  Rather, all three elements operate in combination.  One logical implication of the 
null findings on severity of punishment is to suggest that it falsifies deterrence theory and therefore 
does not matter whether jurisdictions punish criminals they arrest and convict.  This, we suggest, is 
not credible. “…neither certainty nor severity of punishment can substitute for the other… any 
deterrent impact of certainty depends on the level of severity. No doubt, severity by itself cannot 
replace certainty.  But the reverse holds equally true.” (van den Haag, 1975, 115).  Models that do 
not reflect the combination of all deterrence elements fail to translate the theory and are likely to 
fall short of finding a significant effect for all of the components.  In brief, our idea is to put 
severity of punishment back into the deterrence package.    
 We develop the argument and evidence in three steps.  First, we work through the 
translation of the theory into a statistical model.  Second, we review the existing literature in terms 
of the elements that have been implicitly or explicitly specified in the empirical analyses of 
 
deterrence theory.  Third, we test our proposition using Thomas Pogue´s data set (1983) and re-
estimate alternative versions of Scott Decker and Carol Kohfeld’s (1990) model, which they 
applied to these data and found no severity effect.  We find, in the literature and in our own 
empirical analysis, that once punishment is correctly accounted for in a model, the severity of 
punishment has a significant negative effect on crime and does indeed matter as deterrence theory 
tells us.    
 
Deterrence Theory and Its Statistical Representation 
The late 1960s marked a revival of the Classical school idea of criminals as rational beings, 
in contrast to the idea of criminals as persons suffering from psychological and societal neuroses. 
Scholars such as William Chambliss (1966), Jack Gibbs (1968), and Charles Tittle (1969) re-
framed deterrence logic within the context of criminological and sociological theories of deviance.  
About the same time, Gary Becker (1968) extended the reawakened human capital theory of 
economists to include, in the language of economics, the supply and control of crimes. Together, 
these efforts inspired social scientists with a new way to study criminal behavior and spurred a 
large number of theoretical and empirical studies. 
 
Theory 
Becker´s formalization of deterrence theory has clearly withstood the test of time. He lays 
out the principal components of the theory, with an eye toward the certainty and the severity of 
punishment (Becker, 1968, 178).  According to his model: 
O = O (p, f, u).    
The average number of offenses, O, is a function of the average probability of being convicted (p), 
average punishment (f), and a set of average socio-economic forces (u).  The first two elements, p 
and f, are the core components of deterrence theory—i.e., the certainty of punishment and the 
severity of punishment.1  Potential criminals face a choice, and they opt to commit the crime if the 
 
expected gain exceeds the expected cost.  An increase in either the certainty or the severity of 
punishment, while the other is held constant at a nonzero value, will reduce the expected utility 
associated with the crime.    
“Practically all the diverse theories agree, however, that when 
other variables are held constant, an increase in a person’s 
probability of conviction or punishment if convicted would 
generally decrease ... the number of offenses he commits” 
(Becker, 1968, 176).    
Numerous empirical studies have attempted to translate deterrence theory into a statistical 
representation and test its veracity.  As stated above, this body of literature has produced 
ambiguous results in regard to the effect of the different components of deterrence theory.  Most 
studies find evidence in support of a deterrent effect of an increase in the certainty of punishment.  
However, less than half of the studies have found the same to be true of the severity of punishment.  
As a consequence, the more recent literature has tended to favor the certainty of punishment over 
the severity of punishment as a deterrent measure for reducing crime (von Hirsch et al., 1999).    
Deterrence theory is about punishing criminal activity.  Therefore, the expected cost is the 
probability of being punished, reflected in arrest and conviction rates, operating in conjunction with 
the severity of punishment.  That is: 
Expected Cost, Punishment = f( p1  Arrests,   p2 Convictions,  Average Sentence).    
 As a matter to be investigated empirically, potential criminals are supposed to look to 
their environment to form their subjective probabilities in accordance with the objective arrest 
rates, conviction rates of those arrested, and average sentence of those convicted.  The 
hypothesized calculation in the potential criminal’s mind is: 
 
Expected Cost, Punishment  =  Arrest Rate * Conviction Rate|Arrest * Average Sentence.    
If the arrest rate is 40 percent, the conviction rate for those arrested is 50 percent, and the average 
sentence served for the crime is 10 years, then prospective criminals calculate that they can expect 
to spend two years in prison (i.e., .4 x .5 x 10 = 2).  If any one of the three elements reduces to zero, 
as is an implied possibility when one says the severity of punishment does not matter, then the 
expected cost itself reduces to zero.  There is no cost associated with the crime.  
 Deterrence, therefore, must be considered as a package with three components: arrests, 
convictions, and sentences. 2  The failure to find an effect of one of these elements “unbundles” the 
theory and undermines its credibility.  If the threat of a sentence is not backed up with effective or 
real sentences, then how can the deterrent effect of the threat endure?  If potential criminals are 
rational agents as the theory assumes, they would soon perceive that criminal behavior would be 
going unpunished.  This would substantially reduce the cost of committing crime in their eyes.  
Therefore, disregarding the sentencing component of deterrence is not acceptable.  It says the 
theory works part-way, but there is no part-way.  Deterrence theory stands or falls as a whole.   
 
Statistical Representation 
The problem may not be with the theory itself but, rather, with the translation of the verbal 
theoretical statement into a statistical representation of that statement.  Indeed, we maintain that 
this has often been the problem.  As a package, the elements are interrelated and conditional upon 
each other.  Conviction depends on arrests and sentences depend on conviction.  Accordingly, these 
components must be appropriately incorporated into a statistical model, and the proper way to do 
this is to ensure the interdependency among the components.  When severity is included as an 
element independent of arrests and convictions, the model is not telling the whole story.   
What is the whole story in the form of a statistical model?  A helpful way to answer this is 
to return to the arrest rates, conviction rates given arrests, and the average sentence for a particular 
crime.  Expressed in their fractional forms, we have: 
 
Expected Cost,  Punishment   =
       Arrests   *   Convictions   *    Total Length of Sentences Served   
                                               Offenses          Arrests                          Convictions                          .   
The first thing to notice is that the three components operate interdependently.  As we have 
been saying, they are multiplicative elements, not additive.  In statistical models, this would be 
called a three-way interaction.  The second thing to notice is that when the multiplication is carried 
through, several elements cancel.  That is,  
      Expected Cost, Punishment   =
      Arrests   *   Convictions   *   Total Length of Sentences Served    
                                       Offenses          Arrests                          Convictions                         . 
This reduces to:  
                    Expected Cost,  Punishment   =
       Total Length of Sentences Served  
                                                                                 Offenses    
which is to say in a formula what deterrence theory says in words: the expected cost is the amount 
of time the potential criminal could expect to spend in prison.   In a linear statistical model, the 
formulation maintains that crime rates will vary inversely with the expected cost, and thus:  
                 Crime Rate   =   α    +  β          Total Length of Sentences Served   +  ε .    
                                                                  Offenses    
Alternatively, those formulations that use the certainty and severity measures as additive 
terms are not testing the theoretical proposition, so they are not necessarily expected to yield 
deterrent effects.  At least we should not be surprised if they do not.  The additive linear 
specification of deterrence theory unavoidably isolates these components, as the following equation 
shows: 
Crime Rate =  β0 + β1  Arrest Rate  +  β2 Conv Rate + β3  Avg Sentence +  ε .    
If β3 is indistinguishable from zero, one might be tempted to infer that only arrests and 
convictions have deterrent effects and that the length of sentences does not matter.  To say that, 
however, is to leave a huge hole in deterrence theory logic, so big a hole as to falsify the theory.  
 
But, of course, rejecting deterrence theory on the basis of the results from this linear equation does 
not follow because in this equation sentences are taken to be an independent matter.  To see why 
this is not a falsifying result, we can reverse the process and go from the equation to the words.  
The words are that imprisoning persons independent of whether they have been convicted of a 
crime does not deter crimes.  Deterrence theory certainly would agree with that proposition.  If a 
criminal (in)justice system punishes persons regardless of whether they have been convicted, then 
the calculating prospective criminal might as well go ahead and commit the crime.  He or she is 
liable to be punished regardless.   
Isaac Ehrlich (1967, cited in Becker 1968, 178) was among the first to offer an empirical test 
of Becker’s formal model in the late 1960s and early 1970s using sophisticated regression 
analysis.3  A close look at his early, published work reveals that Ehrlich (1973) constructed a 
theoretically more comprehensive market model, but on the deterrence core elements of Becker´s 
original formulation he always used and sometimes insisted on a multiplicative specification.    
“... [T]he theory identifies the basic deterrence variables ... to include the 
unconditional probabilities of conviction and execution which are 
functionally dependent via a multiplicative relationship ...” (Ehrlich, 1977, 
747, emphasis in the original).    
Ehrlich’s formulation of the deterrence elements, however, gives a first impression that the 
statistical model takes an additive form.  His log-linear functional form is: 
ln (Crime Rate) =  β0 + β1 ln Pa  +β2 ln Pc+ β3 ln Sentence Severity + µ .    
where Pa  is the probability of arrest,  Pc is the probability of conviction given arrest, and Sentence 
Severity is a measure of the typical sentence a convicted criminal serves for a given crime.  Of 
course, removing the logarithms shows this formulation has implicitly built in the interdependency 
among the three elements.  That is: 
Crime Rate =  β0´ *  (Pa  β1 )  *  (Pc  β2)   *  (Sentence Severityβ3)   *  µ´.    
 
Despite the early warnings about the proper statistical form of the deterrence components, 
some authors have implicitly and explicitly challenged the log-linear function. Sometimes the 
warnings have been overlooked or ignored. One alternative is to portray the crime rate as semi-
logarithmic (e.g. Swimmer, 1974a; 1974b; Hoenack & Weiler, 1980) or logistic (e.g., Decker & 
Kohfeld, 1990), where the crime rate outcomes are a result of additive, level differences in the 
deterrence elements.  The semi-logarithmic model can take one of two forms, log-lin or lin-log, 
only one of which is additive.  The lin-log model (Hoenack & Weiler, 1980) is multiplicative:  
Crime rate =  β0 + β1 ln Pa  +β2 ln Pc+ β3 ln Sentence Severity + µ . 
or 
 eCrime rate =  β0´ *  (Pa  β1 )  *  (Pc  β2)   *  (Sentence Severityβ3)   *  µ´  .   
 
The log-lin model (Swimmer, 1974a; 1974b) is additive:  
ln (Crime Rate) = β0 + β1  Arrest Rate   + β2  Conv Rate + β3  Avg Sentence +  λ .   
The logistic form (Decker & Kohfeld, 1990) is also additive: 
     ln { Crime Rate 1 - Crime Rate}= β0 + β1  Arrest Rate   +   β2 Conv Rate + β3  Avg Sentence +  γ .   
In last two cases, the interdependency among the elements is lost.  In the lin-log form, the elements 
on the right-hand side add together to produce a result.  For the log-lin form, the re-transformed 
right-hand side becomes: 
Pr (Crime)   =  1/ (1+  e 
 β0 + β1  Arrest Rate +  β2 Conv Rate + β3  Avg Sentence + ø ) ; 
for the logistic form, it becomes: 4    
Odds (Crime)   =   β0 e  β1  Arrest Rate +  β2 Conv Rate + β3  Avg Sentence + δ .    
Theoretical elaboration of deterrence studies to incorporate private demand for protection, 
public demand for law enforcement, and supply of offenses, as in Ehrlich's (1973; 1996) general 
market model, are widely appreciated.  There has been commentary, and in policy studies an 
explicit debate however about the statistical formulation of the core deterrence components.  In 
sociological approaches to studying crime rates, Harold Grasmick & Steven McLaughlin (1978) 
 
criticized Matthew Silberman (1976) for using the language of interactive effects for certainty and 
severity but failing to follow through and use interactions in his analysis.  This has not been of 
much moment, however, inasmuch as most studies in the sociological tradition have focused 
attention on the certainty component alone.  In psychological and social psychological work on 
perceptual deterrence, Grasmick writing with George Bryjak (1980), as well Mark Stafford et al. 
(1986), re-raised the argument expressed in the late 60s in favor of certainty and severity operating 
interactively.  
Of the scores of individual-level studies of perceptual deterrence some make reference to 
Grasmick & Bryjak (1980) but few take the interactive relationship seriously enough to use 
interactions in their statistical estimations.  In part, this is quite likely due to the fact that 
perceptual studies have focused their attention on the certainty component.  Paternoster (1987, 
188), asserts that “Within a few years, those working in the area came to understand that if the 
deterrence process works, it does so solely through perceived certainty”, and citing Jensen et al. 
(1978), he continues “Given doubts about the importance of the severity and celerity of 
punishments…there is justification for focusing deterrence on the perceived certainty of 
punishment. Thus, research testing the perceived-certainty deterrence hypothesis flourished 
…while research on perceived severity waned (italics in the original)”.  More than a decade later, 
after reviewing perceptual deterrence studies, von Hirsch et al. (1999) saw the state of perceptual 
evidence in much the same way.  They wrote, “longitudinal studies have not considered severity 
effects much ... ,” and experimental studies “do not systematically address the effects of severity of 
formal criminal sanctions” (von Hirsch et al. 1999, 35).   
Research that has focused on criminal deterrence as a policy theory and policy instrument, 
principally those studies grounded in the economic approach, have raised the issue of certainty and 
severity's interactive operation in ways that confront one another head on.  That is, the interaction 
has been explicitly debated in policy-focused deterrence research.  In particular, Bowers & Pierce 
(1975), Passell & Taylor (1977), and Layson (1985) estimate equations to see whether the 
 
deterrence hypothesis can be considered robust in the sense that it finds support regardless of the 
functional form.  Bowers & Pierce, as well as Passell & Taylor, arrive at dubious results for 
equation forms other than Ehrlich's log-linear formulation. They conclude that deterrence 
reasoning itself is in doubt.  When Layson finds that the alternatives provide evidence supporting 
all three deterrence components, he concludes: "The deterrence findings are clearly robust with 
respect to the choice of functional forms" (Layson, 1985, 86). 
The problem with these arguments is that deterrence theory gives us the functional form; it 
does not leave it as a matter of choice for the analyst.  It surely matters, relatively speaking, that the 
log-linear form outperforms the others, as it does in all three studies.  If that relative 
outperformance were not the case, we would have to search deterrence theory or an alternative 
theory to explain why the theoretically proper functional form does not work as well as others.  On 
the other hand, it is of no consequence to a deterrence inference that equation forms not derived 
from the theoretical specification perform poorly in the sense of being statistically insignificant.  
Nor does it matter that they perform well in the sense of being significant.    
In sum, we should not expect to find consistent deterrent effects of the certainty and the 
severity measures under all equation forms.  Only when the multiplicative relationship among these 
measures is respected, either directly or indirectly in the lin-log or log-linear form, is Becker´s 
theoretical statement faithfully reflected by a statistical model.   
 
Crime and the Severity of Punishment in the Literature 
Table 1 organizes the results of a literature survey we conducted of the studies that 
estimate the effects of both the certainty and severity of punishment.  Data on punishment severity 
are difficult to obtain, and, as a consequence, most deterrence studies are not able to draw a full 
and clear distinction between these elements.  Still, we have located 33 studies, 10 of which use an 
additive formulation, 18 of which treat the deterrence components as multiplicative, and five of 
which estimate both additive and multiplicative functional forms.  This provides us with 39 
 
analyses that estimate both components of deterrence. Twenty-eight of these studies conform to 
our expectations: when an additive model is used, there is almost always no severity effect, and 
when a multiplicative model is used, there most often is a severity effect.    
[Table 1 about here] 
Apparently, it is not the precise form (e.g. linear, log-lin, etc.) of the additive model that 
fails to uncover a severity effect.  Almost every additive model we have reviewed fails in this 
respect.  Seven studies use additive models in a linear form.  These include: Bean & Cushing 
(1971), Bowers & Pierce (1975), Forst (1976), Passell & Taylor (1977), Klein et al. (1978), 
Layson (1985), and Trumbull (1989).  As shown in Table 1, every one but Layson and Trumbull 
comes up short on the severity of punishment.  Four studies, Swimmer (1974a; 1974b), Vandaele 
(1978), and Layson (1985) adopt a semi-logarithmic additive form.  They too, except for Layson, 
fail to find a significant effect for the severity of punishment.  Finally, Witte (1980), Myers 
(1983), Decker & Kohfeld (1990), as well as Kim et al. (1993), use additive models of a tobit, 
logistic, or event history (Weibull) form and also find no severity effect.    
From Ehrlich´s early analysis onward, the multiplicative models have usually taken a log-
linear form.  They most often have found a severity effect; 15 do and nine do not.  The exceptions 
that we were able to locate are: Sjoquist (1973), Passell & Taylor (1977), Nagin (1978a), Holtman 
& Yap (1978), Klein et al. (1978), Kleck (1979), Hoenack & Weiler—lin-log model (1980), 
Sesnowitz & Hexter (1982), and Willis (1983).     
From Table 1, it is fitting to argue that finding a severity effect depends on choosing a 
multiplicative versus an additive model.  Given these results in the literature, we reason that it is 
inadmissible to judge the severity of punishment as an ambiguous deterrent policy tool.  Most of 
the ambiguity appears to rest on doubts that analysts have about which model is the proper 
statistical formulation of deterrence theory.  The evidence often fails when the translation fails.  
The expected evidence follows from the theory when the translation follows from the theory.    
 
 
An Empirical Investigation 
The variety of studies reported in the literature differ in so many respects that a more 
compelling approach may well be to apply both the additive and multiplicative models to the same 
data, control for relevant forces in the same way, and thereby test whether deterrence theory 
performs as expected.  Building on the early arguments of the proper functional form to test 
deterrence theory, we ask: When the additive and multiplicative formulations are applied, ceteris 
paribus, does the severity of punishment perform as deterrence theory predicts?  In particular, 
does the evidence show an effect when the statistical model keeps the theoretical package intact 
and fail to show an effect when severity is treated as an element independent of the probability of 
punishment?  To explore these questions, we replicate Decker & Kohfeld´s (1990) additive model 
used to analyze crime rates in the U.S. states and extend it by applying the multiplicative form.  
Surely, one could argue with the non-deterrence elements included and excluded from the Decker 
& Kohfeld model.  For instance, Ehrlich´s (1973) theoretical extensions of the Beckerian model to 
create a theoretically comprehensive market model are not much apparent in the Decker & 
Kohfeld model.  Involving ourselves in these extensions would entail further changes in the 
model, and this would not allow us to concentrate directly on the operation of the deterrence 
variables.  With this in mind, we want to stay as close to the Decker & Kohfeld model as we can.    
Data 
Decker & Kohfeld use Pogue´s 1970 data, Deterrent effects of imprisonment and arrests 
in the United States 1960-1970 (ICPSR File 7973).5  These data cover 31 or 32 states, depending 
on the crime category—31 states for robbery, 31 states for larceny, and 32 states for burglary.6    
Descriptive statistics and variable definitions are presented in Table 2.   
[Table 2 about here] 
In 1970, there were on average 100 robberies and approximately nine times as many 
burglaries and eight times as many larcenies for every 100,000 persons.  The average clearance 
 
rate is also substantially higher for robbery than for each of the two property crimes—34% as 
compared to 20% for burglary and 12% for larceny.   The probability of conviction can be 
described as either convictions per offense or convictions given arrests.   In either case, the 
probability measure is higher for robbery than for the two property crimes.  About one third of the 
robberies are cleared by arrest and close to one fifth (19%) of those arrested for robbery are 
convicted.   Only about 20% of burglaries are cleared, and of those arrested a mere 5% are 
convicted.   But even those relatively small numbers for burglaries are better than the 12% 
clearance rate and the 5% conviction rate for larceny.  We can also see that the typical median 
time served is much higher for robbery, approximately 34 months, than for either larceny or 
burglary, about 19-21 months.  None of this is surprising, given that violent crime is more 
vigorously pursued and more harshly punished than are property crimes.    
It is worth noting that the expected cost of these three different types of crime varies 
considerably.  The average expected cost for robbery is 1.82 months, compared to a modest .194 
months (about six days) for burglary and an even more modest .096 months (about three days) for 
larceny.  A part of the difference between the expected costs is due to the longer average sentence 
for robbery, but much of the difference rests with the low conviction rate for burglary and larceny.  
Indeed, based on these aggregate numbers, one could speculate that the robbery crime rate is lower 
than the burglary and larceny rates because, as deterrence theory would predict, the average 
expected cost for robbery is 10 to 20 times higher than for the other types of crime.    
Models 
Decker & Kohfeld (1990) analyzed three crime rates in the form of a log odds (logit) 
transformation and tested the effects of two measures of the certainty of punishment—the clearance 
rate and the probability of imprisonment—and one measure of the severity of punishment—the 
median time served in prison.  Their model is:  
ln(C rate/1- C rate) = β0 + β1Clear + β2Conv|Offn + β3 Time Served  +  β4Nonwhite + β5Unemploy + e, 
 
where all variables are defined in Table 2.  This equation keeps the deterrence package partially 
intact, because their conviction variable expresses convictions as a percentage of all offenses.  This 
is the variable one arrives at by combining the arrest rate with the conviction rate given arrests: 
                                       Prob (Punishment)  =      Arrests    *  Convictions  =         Convictions 
                                                                    Offenses           Arrests      Offenses 
  Decker & Kohfeld find significant negative effects of the certainty of punishment on the 
crime rates, via the probability of conviction, for all three crimes.  They also find that the clearance 
rate has a deterrent effect in the case of robbery.  However, they fail to find evidence of a deterrent 
effect of the length of sentence.  Based on these results, they suggest that the severity of 
punishment is not an effective policy tool for reducing crime.   
We extend the Decker & Kohfeld model by putting all of the deterrent theory components 
back into the package.  We do this, first, by staying close to the Decker & Kohfeld model and 
substituting the expected cost measure, median time served/offenses, for their additive median time 
served.  This model, Alternative 1, takes the form: 
ln(C rate/1- C rate) = β0+ β1Clear + β2Conv|Offn + β3ExpCost +  β4Nonwhite + β5Unemploy + e .    
Because we think the full statement of deterrence theory is translated by having only the 
expected cost term on the right-hand side, we also estimate a second equation, Alternative 2: 
ln(C rate/1- C rate) = β0 + β1ExpCost  +  β2Nonwhite + β3Unemploy + e.    
Finally, we explore the log-linear multiplicative formulation as suggested by Ehrlich and 
others and contrast it with semi-logarithmic equations.  The log-linear equation in this form is: 
ln(C rate)=β0 +β1 ln(Clear) +β2 ln(Conv|Arr) +β3 ln(Time) +β4 ln(Nonwhite) +β5 ln(Unemploy) + e.    
We hypothesize that once the statistical model is written and estimated with the deterrence 
package intact, the severity of punishment will show an effect, contrary to the conclusion of Decker 
& Kohfeld.  This should hold true for the linear multiplicative alternative to the Decker & Kohfeld 
model as well as the log-linear model.    
 
 
Findings 
Table 3 shows the results of the analysis of the certainty and severity of punishment on the 
robbery, burglary, and larceny crime rates according to the Decker & Kohfeld equation and our two 
alternative equations.  Column 1, for each type of crime, presents the results of our replication of 
Decker & Kohfeld´s (1990) analysis plus their two control variables, the percentage of the state 
population that is nonwhite and the state unemployment rate.  Column 2 replaces their additive 
median time served variable with a variable representing the expected cost.  Column 3 reduces the 
model to crime rates as a function of the expected cost plus their two control variables.    
[Table 3 about here] 
Decker & Kohfeld conclude from the results shown in column 1 for each crime that the 
severity of punishment is negligible since the median time served is insignificant for all three 
crimes.  The certainty of punishment, through the probability of conviction, has a significant 
negative impact on all three crimes, and the clearance rate produces a deterrent effect only in the 
case of robbery.    
The results of our first alternative, shown in column 2 for each type of crime, reveal that 
when the expected cost is used as a deterrent measure, the severity of punishment does have an 
effect on the robbery and burglary crime rates.  Except for Conv|Offn, which falls to insignificance 
with the introduction of the ExpCost variable, the remaining results are similar to those of the 
Decker & Kohfeld estimation.  In addition, in moving from the original Decker & Kohfeld model 
to this alternative specification, we improve the overall fit, as adduced from either the adjusted R2 
or the standard error of the estimate (se).    
The respective column 3’s show the results of our second alternative.  When estimating the 
model with the ExpCost as the sole deterrent variable, it is significant across all three crime 
categories, as expected.  This supports our hypothesis that the expected cost of punishment reflects 
the entire deterrence argument.    
 
Figure 1 traces the predicted probabilities based on the model that uses the expected cost 
alone and under the conditions of holding Nonwhite at 10% and Unemploy at 5%, values close to 
their means.  At very low levels of the expected cost, on the order of expecting to spend three to six 
days in prison, the burglary and larceny crime rates are much higher than the robbery crime rate.  
Those two rates, relative to robbery, drop precipitously as the expected cost rises.  This follows, of 
course, from the larger negative expected cost coefficients associated with burglary and larceny, 
compared to that of robbery.  By the point where the expected cost is one half month or higher, 
there is not much that distinguishes rates of one type of crime from those of another type.  This 
indicates, if only tentatively, that a criminal justice system might aim its sights on having the 
expected cost for property crimes run at one half to three quarters of a month.    
[Figure 1 about here] 
Critics might contend that our evidence is a mere artifact.  The total number of criminal 
offenses is the key component of the dependent variable.  Our measure of the expected cost, unlike 
the Decker & Kohfeld additive severity measure, has offenses built into it and, therefore, could 
introduce spuriousness (Nagin, 1978b, 97-8; Eide, 1994, 125).  In other words, perhaps the 
statistical strength we report for expected cost comes from building offenses into expected cost 
(expected cost = median time served/offenses).  To check this possibility, we have taken the 
precaution of re-estimating all the equations in Table 3, with the inverse of offenses, 1/Offn, 
included on the right-hand side.7 
[Table 4 about here] 
 The consequence of including 1/Offn does reveal that there is reason to worry about 
spurious effects of the deterrent elements.  However, that worry has little or nothing to do with the 
expected cost effect.  With 1/Offn controlled for, and with expected cost in the equation, we find 
that the arrest and conviction variables fall to statistical insignificance for all three types of crime.  
More than that, with 1/Offn controlled for, the single best model, as judged by having the highest 
adjusted R2 and the lowest standard error of estimate (se), is the equation with expected cost 
 
standing alone to represent deterrence.  Once potential spuriousness is taken into account, the 
evidence is entirely consistent with deterrence theory expectations.8    
Our final empirical step is to estimate a log-lin, lin-log, and log-linear specification of the 
Decker & Kohfeld (1990) model.   We have three purposes.  First, we want to check the robustness 
of our results with respect to our hypothesis that deterrence is a package.  Second, we want to allow 
for the possibility that the deterrence elements carry different weights when it comes to deterring 
crimes (see endnote 2). Recall that the lin-log and log-linear forms preserve the three-way 
interdependency among arrests, convictions, and sentence length, and, therefore, it should show 
that the severity of punishment has an effect on crime rates.  Unlike the three-way multiplicative 
term in the logit-linear formulation, the lin-log and log-linear models allow each of the three 
deterrence components to have different functional effects—i.e., to take on different exponential 
values.  The possibility of different exponents is an empirical recognition that each component 
might carry a weight different from one another when it comes to deterring crimes.  In the logit-
linear, as well as in any model that creates the combination through a simple multiplication of the 
components, the exponent for each component is assumed to be the same value, 1.0.  Third, we 
want to show that we should not expect to find evidence for deterrence theory when we use the lin-
log model because the interdependency is not present.    
Table 5 reports the results of the estimation of these three models for all three crime types.  
In the case of the lin-log model, shown in the first column for each crime, we find an effect of the 
certainty of punishment through the probability of imprisonment for all three crimes and the 
clearance rate for robbery and larceny.  We also find a significant effect of  the severity of 
punishment on the robbery and burglary crime rates.  As for the log-lin results, in the second 
column of each crime type, we find evidence of an effect of certainty of punishment.  However, the 
severity measure just barely makes statistical significance and only in the case of robbery.9 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
With respect to the log-linear results in the third column for each crime type, the two 
certainty components show theoretically consistent and statistically significant negative effects for 
all three crime categories.  On the question of the severity of punishment, there are also 
theoretically consistent and statistically significant negative impacts for robbery and burglary.  In 
the case of larceny, the estimated effect is positive, small, and unreliable.  So far as we can tell, the 
severity effect for larceny is nonexistent, essentially zero.  Is this because there is in fact no effect 
or is it because there is such small variation across states in the overall expected cost for larceny?  
We cannot be sure.  We do have firm evidence, however, that for robbery and burglary, crimes for 
which the variation in expected cost is two to 15 times larger than that of larceny (see Table 2), the 
effect of the severity of punishment matters.  This attests to our argument that the severity 
component of the deterrence package does carry weight when it comes to deterring crimes.    
Conclusion 
Deterrence is a theory.  To see what it will produce, it is necessary to consider the 
theoretical recipe as something more than a list of ingredients.  According to the theory, deterring 
criminal acts requires combining the probability of arrest, the probability of conviction given arrest, 
and a punishment of some severity following conviction.  The combination of these three 
components creates an expected cost for committing a criminal act.  Each of the three components 
is necessary; no one component acting alone is sufficient.    
Gary Becker´s theoretical specification of deterrence and the words of  early sociologists 
do combine the components.  Over the years, however, the empirical literature on deterrence theory 
has produced ambiguous results in regard to the effectiveness of the severity component of 
deterrence theory. Many empirical investigations report evidence to support the deterrent effect of 
an increase in the certainty of punishment but report no deterrent effect of the severity of 
punishment.  Accepting these results for what they clearly imply—i.e., the severity of punishment 
does not matter—the criminal justice system risks being misinformed about the value of punishing 
criminal behavior.  In this case, deterrence theory would lose all credible theoretical force because 
 
the theory tells us that the probability of arrest and conviction is of limited value when the threat of 
punishment is not backed up with actual punishment.   
We find that published empirical studies that fail to find a significant impact of the severity 
of punishment do not effectively translate the theory.  It is not much of a surprise, then, that those 
studies cast doubt on whether deterrence theory works as it is supposed to work.  On the other 
hand, models that combine the probability of punishment with the severity of punishment to form 
the expected cost as an interdependent multiplicative element, as the theory specifies, report 
evidence consistent with deterrence theory expectations.  Furthermore, we show, through the use of 
Pogue's data for the U.S. states and through a re-estimation of the Decker & Kohfeld (1990) model 
in three different ways, that deterrence theory works as a package and often fails when the package 
is “unbundled”.   
We conclude that deterrence must be treated as a package composed of three elements: 
arrests, convictions, and punishment.  When this is the case, the severity of punishment does indeed 
represent an important role in implementing that package.* 
 
* We are grateful to the ICPSR and the University of Michigan center for Political Studies for 
making available the Pogue data. We would also like to thank Greg Pogarsky for having 
taken the time to read and make helpful comment on this work.  Mendes is particularly 
grateful to the University of Minho and the Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia for 
financial support while on leave at SUNY-Binghamton.    
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Table 1: Survey of the Literature, Effects of Certainty & Severity of Punishment  
 
Author  (Year) Functional Form Significant Effect 
of  the Certainty 
of Punishment  
Significant Effect 
of the Severity of 
Punishment  
Additive 
   
Bean & Cushing (1971) Linear   
Swimmer (1974a) Log-lin   
Swimmer (1974b)* Log-lin   
 Bowers & Pierce (1975) Linear not reported  
Forst (1976) Linear   
Passell & Taylor (1977) Linear a  
Klein et al. (1978) Linear a 
  Vandaele (1978) Log-lin a  
Witte (1980) Tobit               
Myers (1983) Logistic   
Layson (1985) Log-lin  & Linear a      a
Trumbull (1989) Linear a a 
Decker &Kohfeld (1990) Logistic a  
Jarrell & Howsen (1990) Tobit a  
Kim et al. (1993) Event History a  
Multiplicative 
   
Gray & Martin (1969) Linear Multiplicative a a 
Ehrlich (1973) Log-linear a a 
Sjoquist (1973) Log-linear a  
Bowers & Pierce (1975) Log-linear not reported a 
Ehrlich (1975) Log-linear a a 
Phillips & Votey (1975) Log-linear a a 
Ehrlich (1977) Log-linear a a 
Passell & Taylor (1977) Log-linear a  
Nagin (1978a) Log-linear   
Holtman &Yap (1978) Log-linear a  
Klein et al. (1978) Log-linear a  
Wolpin (1978a) Log-linear a a
Wolpin (1978b) Log-linear a a
  Vandaele (1978) Log-linear a a
Kleck (1979) Log-linear   
Wolpin (1980) Log-linear a a
Hoenack & Weiler (1980) Log-linear & Lin-log a a 
Myers (1980) Log-linear a a   
Sesnowitz & Hexter (1982) Log-linear a  
Willis (1983) Log-linear  a  
Layson (1985) Log-linear a     a
Stafford et al. (1986) Log-linear a a 
 
Wong (1995) Log-linear a a 
Note:  A checkmark denotes a significant effect for more than half of the cases at the .05 level with a one-tailed test. 
All studies test for the certainty and severity of punishment. *Swimmer´s (1974b) interaction term does not allow us to measure 
the expected cost of punishment for it excludes the probability of arrest given the commission of a crime.
 
Table 2:  Variables, Definitions, and Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Variable Variable Definition Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Minimu
m 
Maxim
um 
Robbery     
Robb The number of robberies per 100,000 persons known to police 
in 1970 
100.059 99.872 6.400 442.100 
RbClear The percentage of reported robberies cleared  by arrest in 1970 33.512 8.037 19.000 50.600 
RbConv|Arr The percentage of convictions given arrests for robbery in 
1970 
18.885 11.496 3.852 55.488 
RbConv|Off The percentage of persons committed to state prisons in 1970 
for robbery as a proportion of known offenses for that crime in 
1970 
6.646 5.315 .940 28.077 
RbTime The median time served in months before first release by 
persons committed to state prisons for robbery and released in 
1970 
34.273 19.786 13.000 120.000 
RbExpCost Multiplicative term representing the expected cost for 
committing a  robbery in 1970 
1.819 1.043 .330 3.936 
Burglary     
Burg The number of burglaries per 100,000 persons known to police 
in 1970 
914.194 374.134 286.200 1751.500 
BgClear The percentage of reported burglaries cleared  by arrest in 
1970 
19.746 3.767 12.700 28.200 
BgConv|Arr The percentage of convictions given arrests for burglary in 
1970 
5.452 3.344 .807 14.596 
BgConv|Off The percentage of persons committed to state prisons in 1970 
for burglary as a proportion of known offenses for that crime 
in 1970 
1.088 .688 .150 2.890 
BgTime The median time served in months before first release by 
persons committed to state prisons for burglary and released in 
1970 
20.907 17.664 7.500 112.286 
BgExpCost Multiplicative term representing the expected  cost of 
committing a burglary in 1970 
.194 .132 .030 .609 
Larceny     
Larc The number of larcenies per 100,000 persons known to police 
in 1970 
777.824 305.440 254.600 1388.600 
LrClear The percentage of reported larcenies cleared  by arrest in 1970 12.247 4.169 7.500 27.500 
LrConv|Arr The percentage of convictions given arrests for larceny in 
1970 
5.523 4.904 .912 23.646 
LrConv|Off The percentage of persons committed to state prisons in 1970 
for larceny as a proportion of known offenses for that crime in 
1970 
.624 .468 .100 1.939 
 
LrTime The median time served in months before first release by 
persons committed to state prisons for larceny and released in 
1970 
18.766 17.671 6.375 109.500 
LrExpCost Multiplicative term  representing the expected cost of 
committing a  larceny offense in 1970 
.096 .071 .017 .321 
Socioecono
mic 
    
Nonwhite Percentage of the total state population that is nonwhite in 
1970 
9.584 8.603 .707 37.052 
Unemploy The percentage of labor force unemployed in 1970 
 
4.494 1.005 3.200 7.900 
 
Table 3: Results of the Logistic Analyses for Robbery, Burglary, and Larceny in 1970 
 
 
 
      
Robbery Burglar
y 
Larcen
y 
 
 
Variable 
 
Decker and 
Kohfeld   
Model 
 
 
Alternative 1 
Model with 
ExpCost 
 
 
Alternative 2 
Model with 
ExpCost 
operating 
alone 
 
 
Decker and 
Kohfeld  
Model 
 
 
Alternative 1 
Model with 
ExpCost 
 
Alternative 2 
Model with 
ExpCost 
operating 
alone 
 
 
Decker and 
Kohfeld   
Model 
 
 
Alternative 1 
Model with 
ExpCost 
 
 
Alternati
ve 2 
Model 
with 
ExpCost 
operating 
alone 
 
Intercept   -4.307
(.974)* 
 
-4.787 
(.782)* 
-6.148 
(.716)* 
-4.287 
(.507)* 
-4.476  
(.459)* 
-4.720 
(.283)* 
-4.864 
(.526)* 
-4.886 
(.497)* 
-5.202 
(.357)* 
Clear       -.050
(.022)* 
 
-.052 
(.019)* 
-.003
(.017) 
-.005  
(.016) 
-.013
(.021) 
-.014 
(.021) 
 
Conv|Off       -.098
(.035)* 
 
.008 
 (.044) 
-.550
(.097)* 
-.241  
(.172) 
-.485
(.178)* 
-.353 
(.323) 
 
Time        -0.010
 (.008) 
 
-0.005
 (.003) 
 
 
-0.001
 (.004) 
ExpCost 
 
       -.586
 (.019)* 
 
-.731 
(.135)* 
-1.960
(1.020)* 
-3.252 
(.542)* 
-1.021
(2.255) 
-2.918 
(1.156)* 
 
Nonwhite   .018
(.016) 
.042 
 (.016)* 
 
.053 
(.017)* 
.018 
(.007)* 
.029  
(.009)* 
.034 
(.008)* 
-.007 
(.010) 
.009 
 (.011) 
.006 
(.010) 
Unemploy  -.126
 (.145) 
-.049 
 (.131)
 
-.085 
(.136)
0.024 
 (.059) 
.036 
(.058) 
.055 
(.056) 
.080 
 (.076) 
.085 
(.077) 
.114 
(.073) 
N          31 31 31 32 32 32 31 31 31
R2          .578 .669 .550 .588 .611 .571 .289 .294 .242
Adjusted R2           .494 .603 .500 .509 .536 .525 .147 .153 .158
Se          .747 .662 .743 .312 .303 .307 .393 .391 .390
 
Note:  1) The values in parentheses are the standard errors of the coefficients.                *Significant at the.05 level, one-tail test. 
 
 
Table 4: Results of the Logistic Analyses for Robbery, Burglary, and Larceny in 1970, with a Spuriousness Control 
 
 
          Robbery Burglary Larceny
 
Variable  Decker and
Kohfeld   
Model 
 
 
Alternative 1 
Model with 
ExpCost 
 
 
Alternative 2 
Model with 
ExpCost 
operating 
alone 
 
 
Decker and 
Kohfeld   
Model 
 
 
Alternative 1 
Model with 
ExpCost 
 
Alternative 2 
Model with 
ExpCost 
operating 
alone 
 
 
Decker and 
Kohfeld   
Model 
 
 
Alternative 1 
Model with 
ExpCost 
 
Alternative 2 
Model with 
ExpCost 
operating 
alone 
 
Intercept   -5.046
(.749)* 
-5.508 
(.603)* 
-5.775 
(.465)* 
-4.550 
(.413)* 
-4.740 
(.384)* 
-4.553 
(.231)* 
-4.809 
(.459)* 
 
-4.891 
(.435)* 
-4.886 
(.317)* 
Clear       -.007
(.019) 
-.012 
(.017) 
.013
(.014) 
.012 
(.014) 
.002
(.019) 
 
.002 
(.019) 
 
Conv | Off -.089  
(.027)* 
.006 
 (.033) 
    -.415
(.085)* 
-.164 
(.142) 
-.326
(.164)* 
 
-.166 
(.290) 
 
Time        -.011
 (.006)* 
-.005
 (.003)* 
 
 
-.002
 (.004) 
 
 
ExpCost 
 
      -.517
 (.145)* 
-.518 
(.001)* 
-1.599
(.844)* 
-2.392 
(.486)* 
-1.140
(1.972) 
-2.110 
(1.010)* 
 
Nonwhite   .002
(.013) 
.021 
 (.013) 
.021 
(.012)* 
.006 
(.007) 
.015 
(.008)* 
.017 
(.008)* 
-.006 
(.010) 
-.004 
 (.010) 
-.004 
(.009) 
 
Unemploy  -.158
 (.110) 
-.091 
(.098) 
-.105 
(.088) 
.048 
 (.048) 
.058 
(.048) 
.056 
(.045) 
 
.088 
 (.067) 
.094 
(.067) 
.098 
(.062) 
1 / Offn -114.651 
(25.864)* 
-103.934 
(22.642)* 
-113.159
(18.127)* 
-1617.647 
(414.116)* 
-1522.300 
(414.044)* 
-1513.525 
(375.868)* 
-1887.138 
(631.384)* 
-1844.899 
(625.617)* 
-1907.795 
(563.029)* 
N          31 31 31 32 32 32 31 31 31
R2          .768 .824 .820 .744 .748 .732 .482 .482 .475
Adjusted R2           .710 .780 .792 .683 .687 .692 .352 .352 .394
Se          .566 .493 .479 .251 .249 .247 .342 .342 .331
 
Note:  1) The values in parentheses are the standard errors of the coefficients.               *Significant at the .05 level,  one-tail test. 
 
 
Table 5: Results of the Log-Linear and Semi-logarithmic Models for Robbery, Burglary, and Larceny in 1970 
 
 
 
          Robbery Burglary Larceny
 
Variable  Lin-log
 Model 
 
 
Log-lin Model 
 
 
Log-linear 
Model 
 
Lin-log 
 Model 
 
 
Log-lin 
Model 
 
 
Log-linear 
Model 
 
Lin-log 
Model 
 
 
Log-lin 
Model 
 
 
Log-linear 
Model 
 
Intercept   1406.300
(235.636)* 
8.073 
(.938)* 
15.302 
(2.351)* 
2198.574 
(1005.871)* 
7.748 
(.529)* 
9.289 
(1.265)* 
1368.281 
(816.760) 
 
6.723 
(.570)* 
7.603 
(1.199)* 
Clear   -185.761
(53.754)* 
-.066 
(.018)* 
-1.871 
(.536)* 
-271.880 
(250.217) 
-.032 
(.017)* 
-.518 
(.315) 
-385.014 
(202.251)* 
 
-.022 
(.024) 
-.532 
(.297)* 
Conv| Arr -100.183 
(20.574)* 
-.048 
 (.013)* 
-.963 
(.205)* 
-411.768 
(69.041)* 
-.106 
(.020)* 
-.467 
(.087)* 
-211.385 
(67.672)* 
-.037 
(.018)* 
-.289 
(.099)* 
Time  -107.931
 (27.923)* 
-.013 
(.007)* 
-0.676 
(.279)* 
-247.624 
 (111.399)* 
-.006 
(.004) 
 
-.310 
(.140)* 
-72.843 
 (110.626) 
 
-.000 
(.005) 
.090 
(.162) 
Nonwhite  29.634
(12.666)* 
.023 
 (.015) 
.436 
(.126)* 
187.359 
(49.175)* 
.020 
(.007)* 
.212 
(.062)* 
137.818 
(56.625)* 
.003 
 (.010) 
.184 
(.083)* 
Unemploy  -47.978
 (57.673) 
-.139 
(.134) 
-.963 
(.205)* 
337.710 
 (225.411) 
.027 
(.060) 
.117 
(.284) 
402.313 
 (256.273) 
.072 
(.080) 
.401 
(.376) 
N          31 31 31 32 32 32 31 31 31
R2          .714 .635 .742 .644 .564 .596 .404 .215 .352
Adjusted R2           .657 .563 .690 .576 .480 .518 .285 .058 .223
Se          58.605 .695 .585 243.705 .319 .307 253.505 .410 .372
 
Note: 1) The values in parentheses are the standard errors of the coefficients.  *Significant at the .05 level, one-tail test. 
 
Figure 1:  Crime Rates per 100,000 Population Predicted from the Expected  
      Cost of Committing the Crime, by Type of Crime 
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          in Table 3.  All estimates assume a 10% nonwhite population and a 5% unemployment rate. 
 
 
                                                          
1 Celerity, despite its interesting properties and despite interesting recent research on time horizons in decision making 
(Nagin & Pogarsky 2000), is not a core component of deterrence theory as such.  Celerity was a part of the Beccarian and 
Benthamite argument, which also included the core deterrence components of certainty and severity. For that reason, most 
accounts of Classical theory of crime will mention celerity in passing, but not much more. For example, Charles Tittle 
(1980, 8) wrote,  “The original utilitarian thinkers emphasized three sanction traits—certainty, severity, and celerity—and 
modern scholars have continued to focus on the certainty and severity of sanctions although few have considered celerity 
to be of much import except in the context of operant conditioning.” 
One could make an argument for excluding celerity on empirical grounds, as Robert Chauncey (1975, 450-1) 
has when he argued that  “...celerity ...has generally been omitted from detailed consideration for two reasons. First, long 
delays generally are not disadvantageous to the offender, as bail is usually available. Second, celerity tends to become 
intertwined with both certainty and severity, as long delays are associated with complex defense maneuvers, 
nonavailability of witnesses, and increased prosecution willingness to plea bargain. Thus the major emphasis of the 
literature has centered on the attempt to distinguish the deterrent effects of severity from the effects of certainty.” 
However, there are theoretical reasons for not treating celerity as a core component of deterrence.  Jack Gibbs said it best 
(1975,130) when he wrote: “Although Beccaria and Bentham emphasized the importance of the celeritous punishment, 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
celerity is the most debatable variable in the deterrence doctrine.  The only rationale for an emphasis on celerity is found 
in experimental psychology…Since legal punishments (even procedural) are commonly delayed for days if not months or 
years, it is difficult to see how experimental findings support the assumption that differences among jurisdictions or types 
of crime can be attributed even in part to contrasts in the celerity of punishment. In any case, one would surely be pressed 
to argue that the importance of the celerity extends beyond specific deterrence.” 
 
2 Andrew von Hirsch and his colleagues promote an opposing view (von Hirsch et al., 1999).  They argue that it is 
essential for analysts to consider the certainty and severity components separately, because it may be that one rather than 
both components produces the deterrent effect.  We endorse the wisdom of distinguishing between the possible weights 
that the certainty and severity elements may carry. See our results and the text surrounding Table 5.  However, our 
position is that the components must be considered as a theoretical unit and cannot be treated as independent forces that, 
operating alone, could deter anything.    
 
3 About roughly the same time, correlational and frequency analyses incorporating this idea were introduced in the  
sociological literature (Chambliss, 1966; Gibbs, 1968; Tittle, 1969, Logan, 1972). 
 
4 Commentators have suggested that the logistic form is inherently interactive.  It is not (see Frant, 1991, commenting on 
Berry & Berry’s mistaken interaction interpretation of logistic regression).  The mistaken interpretation applies a linear 
model definition of interaction—i.e., that the rate of change in the translation of X into Y depends on the level of a third 
variable—to the logistic results, when those results are displayed as nonlinear probabilities as opposed to log odds.  That 
misconstrues the nonlinear logit translation of X into Y, expressed as probabilities, with an interactive translation of X 
into Y.  In logistic regression, or any log form of Y for that matter, the curve by which X translates into Y shifts left or 
right depending on the level of a third (fourth, or more) variable, but the functional form of that translation is unaffected.  
The single most important fact about the interaction that we are making should be easy to understand at the extreme.  
Deterrence specifies that arrest, conviction, and severity of punishment are individually necessary elements.  We are 
pointing out what sometimes seems to be forgotten; none of these elements is sufficient when operating alone.  By 
implication, if the value of any one of the elements is zero, there is no deterrence because the effect of the other two 
elements falls to zero.  The logistic form, absent the interaction, says no such thing.  Rather, it says that as long as any one 
element and that element’s coefficient are nonzero, then a deterrent effect is produced by virtue of that element operating 
alone, regardless of the values of the other elements.    
 
5 Despite the dated time period of the Pogue data, these data are, to the best of our knowledge, the only existing cross-
jurisdictional account of the time served in prison.  Having that information is essential to our analysis.  Therefore, 
although more recent data are preferred, for the purpose of testing our central proposition, the time period is not an 
especially relevant matter.  The relationship should hold irrespective of the particular year we use.   They are also official 
crime data and, as with all criminal data, self-reported included,  the reader should be wary of the limitations inherent to 
these data.  
 
6 Due to missing data, the analyses cover 31 or 32 states.  Excluded from all analyses are: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, 
Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin.  Vermont is missing from the robbery and larceny analyses.   
 
7 We are also concerned with the potential simultaneous relationship between each of the deterrent variables and the 
dependent variable.  One approach to avoiding a direct form of simultaneity between the 1970 crime rate and the 1970 
deterrence variables, is to re-estimate the equations in Table 3 using values of the deterrence variables from a previous 
year.  We find that regressing the crime rates in 1971 onto the certainty and severity of punishment variables in 1970 
allows us to make the same inferences that we drew from the results in Table 3.  In this way, this form of direct 
simultaneity is not an issue in our analysis.  No evidence of a deterrent effect of the severity of punishment is found with 
the Decker & Kohfeld model.  Only the certainty of punishment, through the probability of imprisonment for all three 
crimes and the clearance rate for robbery, has a significant deterrent effect on the crime rate.  The expected cost continues 
to be significantly inversely related to robbery and burglary but not to larceny using Alternative 1 and to all three crime 
rates using Alternative 2.  In addition, moving from the original Decker & Kohfeld model to our Alternative 1 continues 
to improve the overall fit.    
 
8 Other statistical doubts may exist for readers.  We have checked these as well.  One is multicollinearity.  Observational 
designs often make one wonder whether inferences drawn from an analysis are plagued by doubts that arise from a 
multicollinearity problem.  Doubts resting on inter-correlated independent variables are even more so the case when an 
equation includes an interaction variable formed by the multiplication of other elements that also stand on their own in the 
equation (i.e., so-called main effects).  We have checked the inter-correlation of our variables, and, as one would expect, 
clearance and convictions rates are more highly correlated with the other independent variables in the equations when the 
 1
                                                                                                                                                                                 
interaction is present.  Does that, as such, indicate that the results suffer from a multicollinearity problem?  No.  Multiple 
regression is used to overcome inferential problems arising due to correlated independent variables; if the correlation did 
not exist, there would be little need for anything beyond bivariate analysis.  The problem of multicollinearity exists when 
increased inter-correlation is not offset by a reduction in the standard error of estimate.  When there is no offsetting, the 
standard error of one of more independent variables is inflated and we become uncertain, perhaps highly so, about the size 
of the estimated effect(s).  As one can see in Table 4, the standard error of estimate values are lower when the interactions 
are included than when they are not.  Moreover, the coefficients’ standard errors show little and, sometimes, no sign of 
inflation.  And finally, as we shall show in Table 5 below, when the log-linear model is estimated, the severity variable is 
statistically significant.  Of course, in that model form, it is not plausible to believe that multicollinearity caused most or 
all of the deterrence components to be significant.  The evidence is clear.  The inclusion of the expected cost interaction 
variable tends to partial out the effects of clearance and conviction rates standing alone, as deterrence theory asserts. 
 We have also probed the residuals for signs of heteroscedasticty.  One can see from the descriptive statistics in 
Table 1 that the crime rate variables are skewed positively.  The maximum values are more distant from their respective 
mean compared to the minimum values.  The skew could create doubts associated with outliers or from heteroscedasticity.  
We have no substantial evidence that causes a worry on these scores.  Without going into a full-fledged and detailed 
recounting of the evidence, the convincing results on this regard are provided in Table 5 below in the form of the results 
from the log-linear model. 
9 We extended our testing of the proposition that the three deterrence elements come together to form and operate as a 
single expected cost term.  For instance, the timed served variable in the semi-log and even the log-linear equations in 
Table 5 could be replaced by a single expected cost variable.  When that adjustment is made, the evidence on robbery and 
burglary tends to support the use of the expected cost variable.  None of the deterrence terms reach statistical significance 
for larceny.  The single expected cost variable is statistically significant in all three equations forms for robbery and 
burglary.  The conviction rate variable is never significant.  The clearance rate variable is significant for the log-lin and 
log-linear versions of the robbery equation but not for any of the three burglary equations.    
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